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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Robert Michael Williston appeals from the judgment entered upon his 
guilty plea to attempted strangulation. On appeal, he argues that the district 
court abused its discretion by denying his motion to withdraw his guilty plea. 
Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings 
Williston, who was on felony probation, "got pissed" and "started slapping 
the shit out" of his wife, Sheri. (PSI, pp.3-4, 9, 28. 1) He "hit Sheri multiple times 
in the face" and body, kicked her in the face "several times," pulled her hair and 
dragged her "by her arms then her hair," threw her into a wall, and "shook her by 
her neck" and choked her, squeezing her neck until "it was hard [for her] to 
breath[e]" and she "believes she blacked out." (PSI, pp.3-4, 28-30.) When 
officers responded, they "immediately saw that Sheri's face was battered. Both 
eyes were swollen and bruised a deep red/purple color. Her cheeks, lips and 
nose also appeared [to be] swollen" and she had "marks" on both sides of her 
neck, "indicative of someone who has been choked." (PSI, pp.26, 30.) Sheri 
was admitted to the hospital with a subdural hematoma and suffered optical 
nerve damage and loss of vision in her left eye, significant throat trauma with a 
tracheal cartilage fracture, and "on-going bleeding on her brain," requiring 
"repeated CAT scans." (PSI, pp.3, 29, 32, 35.) 
1 PSI page numbers correspond with the page numbers of the electronic file 
"ROBERT WILLISTON - SEALED.pdf." 
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The state charged Williston with attempted strangulation and felony 
domestic battery. (R., pp.34-35.) Pursuant to a plea agreement, Williston pied 
guilty to attempted strangulation and the state agreed to dismiss the remaining 
charge and any associated misdemeanor offenses. (R., pp.40-41.) As part of 
the plea agreement, Williston waived his right to appeal his conviction. (R., 
p.41.) Sentencing was scheduled for November 25, 2013, and the presentence 
report was filed on November 18, 2013. (R., p.40; PSI, p.1.) The sentencing 
hearing was rescheduled several times (R., pp.50, 53, 58) and, on March 10, 
2014 - two weeks before the scheduled sentencing - Williston filed a motion to 
withdraw his guilty plea (R., p.61 ). As the basis for his motion, Williston asserted 
that his plea "was not made knowingly, intelligently or voluntarily." (R., p.61.) 
The district court held a hearing on Williston's motion to withdraw his guilty 
plea, at which Williston testified as to the grounds for his motion. (R., pp.71-74.) 
Williston testified that his plea was not entered knowingly, intelligently or 
voluntarily because, among other things, his counsel at the time of his guilty plea 
told him that he was guilty of attempted strangulation if he merely "touched" the 
victim's neck and he was not, therefore, advised of the intent element of the 
crime. (3/24/14 Tr., p.32, Ls.11-17; p.33, L.21 - p.34, L.12.) The district court 
denied Williston's motion to withdraw his guilty plea, concluding that Williston 
failed to carry his burden of establishing either that his plea was involuntary or 
that there existed another just reason to withdraw the plea. (R., pp.75-81.) 
Specifically, the district court found that the language in the information advised 
Williston of the intent element of attempted strangulation, that Williston's 
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statements at the change of plea showed an understanding of the nature of the 
charge, and that Williston's testimony that he did not understand the nature of the 
charge "lack[ed] credibility." (R., pp.75, 79-80.) 
The district court subsequently entered judgment on Williston's guilty plea 
to attempted strangulation and imposed a unified sentence of 12 years, with eight 
years fixed. (R., pp.88-90.) Williston timely appealed. (R., pp.91-94.) 
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ISSUE 
Williston states the issue on appeal as: 
Did the district court abuse its discretion when it denied Mr. Williston's 
motion to withdraw his guilty plea? 
(Appellant's brief, p.4.) 
The state rephrases the issue on appeal as: 
Has Williston failed to establish that the district court abused its discretion 
by denying Williston's motion to withdraw his guilty plea? 
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ARGUMENT 
Williston Has Failed To Establish An Abuse Of Discretion In The Denial Of His 
Motion For Withdrawal Of His Guilty Plea 
A. Introduction 
Williston contends the district court abused its discretion by denying his 
pre-sentencing motion to withdraw his guilty plea. (Appellant's brief, p.4.) 
Specifically, he argues that his plea was not voluntary because he was not 
informed of the intent element of attempted strangulation before he entered his 
guilty plea. (Appellant's brief, pp.6-15.) Williston's argument fails. A review of 
the record and the applicable law supports the district court's determination that 
Williston failed to carry his burden of establishing either that his plea was 
involuntary or that there existed any other just reason entitling him to withdraw 
his plea. Williston has failed to establish an abuse of discretion. 
B. Standard Of Review 
"Appellate review of the denial of a motion to withdraw a plea is limited to 
whether the district court exercised sound judicial discretion as distinguished 
from arbitrary action." State v. Hanslovan, 147 Idaho 530, 535-536, 211 P.3d 
775, 780-781 (Ct. App. 2008) (citing State v. McFarland, 130 Idaho 358, 362, 941 
P.2d 330, 334 (Ct. App. 1997)). An appellate court will defer to the trial court's 
factual findings if they are supported by substantial competent evidence. State v. 
Holland, 135 Idaho 159, 15 P.3d 1167 (2000); Gabourie v. State, 125 Idaho 254, 
869 P.2d 571 (Ct. App. 1994). 
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C. Williston Failed To Show Either That His Plea Was Involuntary Or That 
There Existed Any Other Just Reason For Withdrawing His Guilty Plea 
A motion to withdraw a guilty plea may be made before sentence is 
imposed. I.C.R. 33(c). The presentence withdrawal of a guilty plea is not an 
automatic right, however. State v. Carrasco, 117 Idaho 295, 298, 787 P.2d 281, 
284 (1990); Hanslovan, 147 Idaho at 535, 211 P.3d at 780. The defendant bears 
the burden of proving, in the district court, that the plea should be withdrawn. 
Hanslovan, 147 Idaho at 535, 211 P.3d at 780; Griffith v. State, 121 Idaho 371, 
374-75, 825 P.2d 94, 97-98 (Ct. App. 1992). In ruling on a motion to withdraw a 
guilty plea, the district court must determine, as a threshold matter, whether the 
plea was entered knowingly, intelligently and voluntarily. State v. Mauro, 121 
Idaho 178, 180, 824 P.2d 109, 111 (1991); Hanslovan, 121 Idaho at 536,211 P.3d 
at 781; State v. Rodriguez, 118 Idaho 957, 959, 801 P.2d 1308, 1310 (Ct. App. 
1990). 
In order for a guilty plea to be voluntary, a defendant must be informed of 
the intent elements requisite to the charged offense. Sparrow v. State, 102 Idaho 
60, 61, 625 P.2d 414, 415 (1981) (citing Henderson v. Morgan, 426 U.S. 637, 
644-45 (1976); State v. Bradley, 98 Idaho 918,575 P.2d 1306 (1978)). A record 
may be established showing that a defendant has been informed of the elements 
of the crime to which he is pleading guilty through a properly drafted charging 
document, which should contain, among other things, a clear statement of the 
elements of the offense. State v. Gonzales,_ Idaho_,_ P.3d _, 2015 
Opinion No. 8, 2015 WL 668745 (Ct. App. 2015) (citing Hamling v. United States, 
418 U.S. 87, 117 (1974); State v. Windsor, 110 Idaho 410, 417, 716 P.2d 1182, 
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1189 (1985); State v. McKeehan, 91 Idaho 808, 815, 430 P.2d 886, 893 (1967); 
State v. Grady, 89 Idaho 204, 209-10, 404 P.2d 347, 350 (1965); State v. 
Holcomb, 128 Idaho 296, 300, 912 P.2d 664, 668 (Ct. App. 1995); State v. Leach, 
126 Idaho 977, 978, 895 P.2d 578, 579 (Ct. App. 1995)). A defendant provided 
with a copy of his charging document before pleading guilty is presumed to know 
the nature of the charge against him. United States v. Vann, 535 U.S. 55, 75 
(2002); United States v. Bousley, 523 U.S. 614, 618 (1998). Additionally, the 
requirement that a defendant be informed of the intent element requisite to the 
charged offense may be satisfied where, as here, the complaint or information 
containing a reference to the necessary element of intent was read to the 
defendant, and there was no showing that the defendant was not conversant with 
the English language or that he lacked normal intelligence and education. 
Bradley, 98 Idaho at 918-919, 575 P.2d at 1306-1307; Fowler v. State, 109 Idaho 
1002, 1003, 712 P.2d 703, 704 (Ct. App. 1985); Gonzales, Idaho at_,_ 
P.3d at_, 2015 Opinion No. 8, 2015 WL 668745 at_. 
The failure of a defendant to present and support a plausible reason, even 
in the absence of prejudice to the state, will dictate against granting withdrawal. 
State v. Ward, 135 Idaho 68, 72, 14 P.3d 388, 392 (Ct. App. 2000) (citing State v. 
Q.QQQ, 124 Idaho 481, 485, 861 P.2d 51, 55 (1993); McFarland, 130 Idaho at 362, 
941 P.2d at 334)). "[T]he good faith, credibility, and weight of the defendant's 
assertions in support of his motion to withdraw his plea are matters for the trial 
court to decide." Hanslovan, 147 Idaho at 537, 211 P.3d at 782 (citations 
omitted). The credibility of the witnesses, the weight to be given to their 
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testimony, and the inferences to be drawn from the evidence are all matters 
solely within the province of the district court. Daniels v. State, 156 Idaho 327, 
329, 325 P.3d 668, 670 (Ct. App. 2014) (citing Dunlap v. State, 141 Idaho 50, 56, 
106 P.3d 376, 382 (2004); Larkin v. State, 115 Idaho 72, 73, 764 P.2d 439, 440 
(Ct.App.1988)). 
On appeal, Williston argues that his plea was not entered knowingly, 
intelligently, and voluntarily because he was not informed of the intent element of 
attempted strangulation before he entered his guilty plea. (Appellant's brief, 
pp.6-15.) The record supports the district court's factual finding that Williston was 
informed of the intent element of attempted strangulation. Moreover, Williston's 
reliance on evidence that the district court found not credible fails to show clear 
error. 
The elements of the crime of attempted strangulation are set forth in Idaho 
Code § 18-923: 
(1) Any person who willfully and unlawfully chokes or attempts to 
strangle a household member, or a person with whom he or she 
has or had a dating relationship, is guilty of a felony punishable by 
incarceration for up to fifteen (15) years in the state prison. 
(2) No injuries are required to prove attempted strangulation. 
(3) The prosecution is not required to show that the defendant 
intended to kill or injure the victim. The only intent required is the 
intent to choke or attempt to strangle. 
Both the complaint and the information in this case were properly drafted and 
contained a clear statement of the elements of attempted strangulation, charging 
Williston as follows: 
... [Diefendant, ROBERT MICHAEL WILLISTON, on or 
about the 29t ... of August, 2013, in the County of Kootenai, State 
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of Idaho, did willfully and unlawfully choke or attempt to strangle the 
person of Sheri Williston, to-wit: by wrapping his hand or hands 
around the victim's throat and squeezing, and where Sheri Williston 
and the defendant are household members. 
(R, pp.18-19, 34-35.) 
The district court read the complaint to Williston in open court at the first 
appearance held on September 3, 2013, after which Williston stated that he 
understood the nature of the charges. (R., p.20.) Although Williston waived the 
reading of the information at the guilty plea hearing, stating he "would prefer not 
to hear it" (10/4/13 Tr., p.15, Ls.5-8), the district court instructed Williston to look 
at the written charge and then read it to him: 
Go ahead and look at Count I with me, please. It alleges 
that on August the 29th of 2013 here in Kootenai County, it says that 
you willfully and unlawfully choked or attempted to strangle a 
person by the name of Sheri Williston. Is all of that true? 
(10/4/13 Tr., p.20, Ls.5-10 (emphasis added)). Williston responded, "Yes, sir." 
(10/4/13 Tr., p.20, L.11 ). The court also noted the information "describes how 
you did that" ("by wrapping his hand or hands around the victim's throat and 
squeezing" (R, p.35)), thus establishing a factual basis for the plea (10/4/13 Tr., 
p.20, Ls.12-17). Additionally, with respect to the attempted strangulation charge 
as set forth in the information - a copy of which Williston had before him at the 
guilty plea hearing (10/4/13 Tr., p.12, Ls.7-11) - Williston stated, " ... I'm not 
denying this allegation. There's - that would be completely ludicrous. / did what 
I'm charged with .... " (10/4/13 Tr., p.16, Ls.9-11 (emphasis added).) 
The district court found, on the record, that Williston had reviewed and 
understood the charge of attempted strangulation based on the information, thus 
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creating the presumption that Williston knew the nature of the charge to which he 
was pleading guilty. Vonn, 535 U.S. at 75; Bousley, 523 U.S. at 618. Williston's 
admission that he willfully choked or attempted to strangle the victim, specifically 
by wrapping his hands around her throat and squeezing as set forth in the 
information, is not consistent with his later claim that he merely "touched [his] 
wife by her neck" and believed this constituted attempted strangulation. (3/24/14 
Tr., p.33, L.21 - p.34, L.1.) Moreover, the district court specifically found 
Williston's testimony in support of his motion was not credible. (R., pp.78-80.) 
Because Williston did not present any credible evidence to support his motion, 
and because providing Wilson with a copy of the charging document which 
correctly set forth the elements of the crime created a presumption that he knew 
the nature of the charge to which he was pleading guilty, the district court 
correctly found that Williston failed to establish either that his guilty plea was 
involuntary or that there existed any other just cause for withdrawal of the plea. 
On appeal Williston argues that "attempted strangulation has an intent 
element which requires the State to prove that a defendant intended to make the 
victim fearful or uncomfortable while the defendant was compressing h [sic] 
throat with strong external pressure." (Appellant's brief, p. 8.) The statute, which 
is the best place to look for elements of a crime, defines the mental state element 
was "willfully." I.C. § 18-923(1 ). The approved jury instruction, another good 
place to look for elements of the crime, defines the mental state as "willfully." 
ICJI 1214. Neither says anything about fear or discomfort. Williston relies on a 
statement by the Idaho Court of Appeals, made in the context of determining 
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whether the statute is facially vague and not determining the elements of the 
crime, that "choking an individual generally would entail an intent to at least make 
the person temporarily uncomfortable or fearful." (Appellant's brief, p. 8 (quoting 
State v. Laramore, 145 Idaho 428, 432, 179 P.3d 1084, 1088 (Ct. App. 2007) 
(emphasis added).) That attempted strangulation "generally would entail" 
discomfort and fear does not make discomfort and fear an element of the crime 
any more than the fact that methamphetamine abuse "generally would entail" bad 
teeth means the prosecution must admit the defendant's dental records in 
possession trials. Williston's argument is meritless. 
Williston next argues that his testimony established he was not informed 
of the correct mental state element. (Appellant's brief, pp. 8-9.) Williston fails to 
acknowledge that the district court specifically found his testimony not credible. 
(Id.) As such Williston's argument is irrelevant. 
The district court determined that Williston was notified of the elements of 
the crime on the record and that Williston's testimony to rebut that notification 
was not credible. The record supports the district court's findings. Williston's 
argument to the contrary depends on a meritless legal argument and ignores the 
district court's credibility determination. Williston has failed to show that the 




The state respectfully requests that this Court affirm the district court's 
order denying Williston's motion to withdraw his guilty plea. 
DATED this 20th day of March 201 . 
VICTORIA RUTLEDGE 
Paralegal 
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